The Evolution of Emergency Management in the United States

Associated Press

What is “emergency management?”  According to Haddow, Bullock, and Coppola (2017), “the definition of emergency management can be extremely broad and all-encompassing.”  It is an evolving discipline whose priorities have changed in response to diverse events, political leadership, and scientific advances.

The nature of the events and the responses of political leaders have been the most influential in shaping emergency management priorities and organizational structure.  Since emergency management “deals with risk and risk avoidance” (Haddow, Bullock, & Coppola, 2017), no single event will be handled in precisely the same way.  A terrorist attack like 9/11, which was a major criminal event that involved foreigners and foreign countries, will have a much greater impact on the psyche of the American people and affect a broader range of government departments, than a natural event like a hurricane or earthquake.

The U.S. Constitution “gives the states the responsibility for public health and safety – hence the responsibility for public risks – with the federal government in a secondary role.  The federal role is to help when the state, local or individual entity is overwhelmed” (Haddow, Bullock, & Coppola, 2017).

What kind of events can hit American communities?  Natural events include floods, earthquakes, hurricanes, storm surges, tornadoes, wildfires, land movements such as avalanches and mudslides, tsunamis, volcanic eruptions, severe winter storms, drought, extremes of heat and cold, coastal erosion, thunderstorms, lightning, and hail.  Technological events can include building fires, dam failures, hazardous material incidents, nuclear and radiation accidents. 

Criminal events include terrorism and the potential use of biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons (Haddow, Bullock, & Coppola, 2017).      

On May 31, 1889, the South Fork dam in Johnstown, PA failed, and “unleashed 20,000,000 tons of water that devastated” the town and killed 2,209 residents (National Park Service,2017).  The failure was caused by inadequate construction, maintenance, and repair.  This event caught the attention of the entire world, and people banded together to help “the Johnstown sufferers” (National Park Service, 2017).

In 1803, Congress passed legislation authorizing federal funds to help a town in New Hampshire destroyed by fire.  This set the precedence for federal involvement in local events.  But it was under Franklin D. Roosevelt “that the federal government began to make significant investments in emergency management functions” (Haddow, Bullock, & Coppola, 2017).

The Reconstruction Finance Corporation and the Bureau of Public Roads were authorized “to make disaster loans available for repair and reconstruction of certain public facilities” (Haddow, Bullock, & Coppola, 2017) in the 1930s. The Tennessee Valley Authority – established to produce hydroelectric power – also sought to reduce flooding in the valley (Haddow, Bullock, & Coppola, 2017).

The Flood Control Act of 1936 authorized the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers “to design and build flood-control projects” (Haddow, Bullock, & Coppola, 2017).  Now, “humans could control nature” and promote growth and development in areas previously unavailable (Haddow, Bullock, & Coppola, 2017).

The 1950s and the Cold War brought a whole new dynamic to the discipline of emergency management.  Scientists had succeeded in creating a whole new arsenal of weapons with the capability of destroying the world.  The potential for nuclear holocaust was so great, “civil defense programs proliferated across communities” (Haddow, Bullock, & Coppola, 2017).  People built bomb shelters to protect themselves, their families, and their communities.  A feeling of paranoia gripped the entire nation as U.S. politicians engaged diplomatically with representatives from the Soviet Union.                                                                            

The Federal Civil Defense Administration (FCDA) was a poorly-funded department “whose main role was to provide technical assistance” (Haddow, Bullock, & Coppola, 2017) in the event of nuclear attack.  In reality, however, it was the civil defense directors at the local and state levels who shaped the policies and response to potential disaster.

The 1960s focused attention on natural disasters, and the National Flood Insurance Act of 1968 was passed by Congress.  The National Flood Insurance Program was subsequently created, which helped to ease the burden on homeowners located in flood areas and to act proactively before the floods began.  This legislation emphasized “the concept of community-based mitigation” (Haddow, Bullock, & Coppola, 2017).  When communities joined the NFIP, they committed themselves to passing local ordinances which controlled development in floodplain areas.  The federal government produced floodplain maps to support these ordinances.

George Bernstein, who became head of the Federal Insurance Administration under President Richard Nixon, strengthened the program by “linking the mandatory purchase of flood insurance to all homeowner loans that were backed by federal mortgages” (Haddow, Bullock, & Coppola, 2017).  This led to the Flood Insurance Act of 1972.

During the 1970s, “more than 100 federal agencies were involved in some aspect of risks and disasters” (Haddow, Bullock, & Coppola, 2017).  The fragmentation, conflicts, and confusion that resulted were no different on the state and local levels.  When Three Mile Island occurred, these problems became all-too-apparent to the general public.  As a result, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) was created by Congress under President Jimmy Carter, with the director reporting directly to the president.

Reorganization Plan Number 3, which created FEMA, sought to establish the following guidelines: FEMA workers “were to anticipate, prepare for, and respond to major civil emergencies” (Haddow, Bullock, & Coppola, 2017); the agency would demand “the most efficient use of all available resources” (Haddow, Bullock, & Coppola, 2017); “emergency responsibilities should be extensions of federal agencies” (Haddow, Bullock, & Coppola, 2017); and “federal hazard mitigation activities should be closely linked with emergency preparedness and response functions” (Haddow, Bullock, & Coppola, 2017).

In the 1980s, civil defense became the priority under President Ronald Reagan.  Director Louis Giuffrida reorganized FEMA, moved multiple departments into one building, and placed the agency’s priority “on government preparedness for a nuclear attack” (Haddow, Bullock, & Coppola, 2017).  Giuffrida resigned after a financial scandal, which undermined the credibility of the agency.  The new director, Julius Becton, worked to restore “integrity to the operations and appropriations of the agency” (Haddow, Bullock, & Coppola, 2017).  Under Becton’s leadership, natural hazards like earthquakes, hurricanes, and floods were given a low priority, confirming that the agency “continued the pattern of isolating resources for national security priorities without recognizing the potential of a major natural disaster” (Haddow, Bullock, & Coppola, 2017).

Senator Al Gore, during Senate hearings, questioned FEMA’s priorities and its preparedness in the event of a major earthquake.  FEMA was pressured to create an earthquake preparedness plan which “would later become the standard for all of the federal agencies’ response operations” (Haddow, Bullock, & Coppola, 2017).

Under George H.W. Bush, multiple natural disasters occurred – including Hurricane Andrew – which affected people’s perception of FEMA.  “People wanted, and expected, their government to be there to help in their time of need” (Haddow, Bullock, & Coppola, 2017).  FEMA was perceived as weak and ineffective.

James Witt was appointed Director by President Bill Clinton.  Witt had extensive experience in emergency management and reorganized FEMA to support community relations, the efficient use of new technology, and an emphasis on “mitigation and risk avoidance” (Haddow, Bullock, & Coppola, 2017).

The 1990s heralded a new wave of natural disasters.  FEMA successfully handled the Midwest floods of 1993 and initiated “the largest voluntary buyout and relocation program to date in an effort to move people out of the floodplain . . .” (Haddow, Bullock, & Coppola, 2017).

Director Witt became a member of Clinton’s cabinet and persuaded state governors “to include their state emergency management directors in their cabinets” (Haddow, Bullock, & Coppola, 2017).  This is how important emergency management had become.

The bombing of the World Trade Center in 1993 and the Oklahoma Bombing in 1995 reaffirmed the notion that terrorist events fall into the category of “risks and the consequences of those risks” (Haddow, Bullock, & Coppola, 2017).  Emergency management has been an important part of handling similar events.

FEMA’s Project impact: Building Disaster-Resistant Communities heralded “a new community-based approach” (Haddow, Bullock, & Coppola, 2017) that required communities “to identify risks and establish a plan to reduce those risks” (Haddow, Bullock, & Coppola, 2017).  The ultimate goal was for the community to “promote sustainable economic development, protect and enhance its natural resources, and ensure a better quality of life for its citizens” (Haddow, Bullock, & Coppola, 2017).

Project Impact was defunded under President George W. Bush.  After the unexpected earthquake in Seattle, however, FEMA received a lot of praise from Seattle’s mayor, and the program was restored.  Seattle, it turned out, had been “one of the most successful Project impact communities” (Haddow, Bullock, & Coppola, 2017).

The events of 9/11 proved the effectiveness of FEMA when “hundreds of response personnel initiated their operations within just minutes of the onset of events” (Haddow, Bullock, & Coppola, 2017).  FEMA was then incorporated into the newly-formed Department of Homeland Security and lost much of its effectiveness and power.  The new National Incident Management System (NIMS) fell under the auspices of the Director of Operations Coordination (Haddow, Bullock, & Coppola, 2017).

The threat of Hurricane Katrina off the Gulf Coast in 2005 prompted President Bush to declare “a disaster in advance of an emergency event for the states in the projected impact zone” (Haddow, Bullock, & Coppola, 2017) and caused DHS/FEMA to shoulder the responsibility.  Their response was a failure.

Obama’s appointee, W. Craig Fugate, designated victims of disasters as “survivors” and developed the Whole Community concept which emphasized “preparedness partnerships that had been developed among federal, state, local, private sector, voluntary, and non-profit entities” (Haddow, Bullock, & Coppola, 2017).  Involving people from all sectors of the community has increased the effectiveness of emergency management response to disasters.

The history and development of emergency management prove how events influence and shape government policies, departmental organization, leadership priorities, and government response to national emergencies.  When all citizens get involved, emergency preparedness and response protect communities and mitigate the costs of recovery.

Dawn Pisturino

Thomas Edison State University

August 8, 2019

Copyright 2019-2021 Dawn Pisturino. All Rights Reserved.

References

Haddow, G.D., Bullock, J.A., & Coppola, D.P. (2017). Introduction to emergency

       management. Cambridge, MA: Elsevier Inc.

National Park Service. (2017). Johnstown flood national memorial pennsylvania.

       Retrieved from http://www.nps.gov/jofl/index.htm.

9/11, the Incident Command System, and the National Incident Management System

Incident Command System and the National Incident Management System

[Twenty] years ago, America changed forever.  Protecting our nation from terrorist attacks became the primary objective.  The systems and operations developed to prepare, plan, mitigate, respond, and recover from terrorist attacks expanded to include ALL disasters.  We now have a national disaster plan which is utilized at the local, tribal, state, and federal levels.

Brief Overview of the Events of 9/11

At 8:46 a.m. on September 11, 2001, American Airlines Flight 11 crashed into the North Tower of the World Trade Center in New York City.  Seventeen minutes later, United Airlines Flight 175 smashed into the South Tower.  At 9:37 a.m., American Airlines Flight 77 nose-dived into the Pentagon building in Arlington, Virginia.  All three airplanes had been hijacked by members of the radical Islamic terrorist organization, Al Qaeda (Haddow, 2017; 911 Memorial, 2018).

“The use of fuel-filled planes caused catastrophic fires in all three buildings impacted, and this led to collapse of both World Trade Center towers and the wing of the Pentagon directly affected” (Haddow, 2017, p. 393).  The federal government has spent more than $20 billion on the response and recovery of the World Trade Center attacks alone.  On the positive side, the events of 9/11 led to the creation of the Department of Homeland Security and the development and implementation of a more comprehensive and advanced national response to disasters, regardless of size and cause (Haddow, 2017).

The Core Components of the National Incident Management System (NIMS)

“NIMS was created to integrate effective practices in emergency preparedness and response into a comprehensive national framework for incident management” (Haddow, 2017, p.247).  Its flexibility allows it to adapt to any kind of disaster, from routine incidents involving local communities to large-scale events, such as hurricanes or earthquakes (DHS, 2008).  NIMS provides a template for “coordination and standardization among emergency management/response personnel and their affiliated organizations” (DHS, 2008, p.7).

The National Incident Management System is guided by five core components: preparedness; communications and information management; resource management; command and management; and ongoing management and maintenance.  The National Integration Center is responsible for directing NIMS, using the latest technology and operational systems (DHS, 2008).

Preparedness is a multi-task discipline which uses assessment skills; advanced planning; appropriate procedures and protocols; up-to-date training and practice exercises; skilled personnel with the proper licensure and certification; the latest technology and equipment; and the ability to evaluate responses to events and revise protocols and procedures for improved responses to future events (DHS, 2008).

Communications and information management are crucial to emergency responders because all command and coordination stations must share a common goal and operating system in order to work effectively as a team (DHS, 2008).

Resource management demands that “the flow of resources [personnel, equipment, etc.] be fluid and adaptable to the requirements of the incident” (DHS, 2008, p. 8)  Without a well-coordinated movement of resources to the disaster site, responders cannot do their job in a timely and efficient manner.

Command and management “enable effective and efficient incident management and coordination by providing a flexible, standardized incident management structure” (DHS, 2008, p. 8) which involves the Incident Command System, Multi-agency Coordination Systems, and public information.  Jurisdiction, authority, and multi-agency involvement must be decided and coordinated before and during the disaster event for the response to be successful.

Ongoing management and maintenance by the National Integration Center ensures that the National Incident Management System will always perform at a top-notch level.  Failures and successes must be evaluated and addressed and systems refined accordingly (DHS, 2008).

How the Components of NIMS Support and Complete the Incident Command System (ICS)

“NIMS was developed as an outgrowth of ICS that allows for increased interorganizational coordination that is not necessarily addressed under standard ICS structures.  The system is designed to be a more comprehensive incident management system than ICS because it goes beyond the field-level incident command and control and addresses all phases of emergency management, as well as all stakeholders (including the NGO and private sectors).  It does not, however, replace ICS” (Haddow, 2017, p. 248).

The National Incident Management System provides a template by which the ICS can operate more efficiently.  It is an upper management organizational system that oversees the entire operation of a disaster event (Haddow, 2008).

The Incident Command System falls under the command and management component of the National Incident Management System.  ICS addresses all hazards, regardless of cause, at the federal, state, tribal, and local levels.  NGOs and the private sector are also included (DHS, 2008).

The ICS standardizes the use of common terminology for all agencies involved; inventories and describes resources used; and records incident fatalities (DHS, 2008).

A flexible organizational system adapts the ICS to the needs of a particular event.  A small, community-based incident will require less manpower and fewer resources than an event on the scale of Hurricane Katrina (DHS, 2008).

ICS develops a set of objectives by which an event can be measured, studied, and evaluated.  This is important for quality improvement.  The Incident Commander or Unified Commander creates an Incident Action Plan which “should guide all response activities” (DHS, 2008, p. 47).  There should be enough staff and supervisors involved to make the work flow go as planned (DHS, 2008).

The Incident Commander determines and oversees the locations of command facilities.  Resources must be carefully managed to control costs and availability.  Communication systems must be set up and maintained to provide optimal information sharing and communication (DHS, 2008).

How NIMS and ICS were Utilized in the Events of 9/11

The events of 9/11 resulted in a large number of fatalities among first responders.  It became necessary to re-evaluate and re-write appropriate procedures and protocols.  At that time, there were no procedures in place to deal with terrorist attacks.  The Department of Homeland Security was created, which absorbed FEMA into its structure.  The National Incident Management System gradually developed and was finally published in 2008 (Hadddow, 2017).

As soon as the North Tower of the World Trade Center in New York City was attacked on 9/11, New York City emergency dispatchers sent police, paramedics, and firefighters to the site.  Battalion  Chief Joseph Pfeifer of the New York City Fire Department dispatched additional fire personnel and equipment.  The Port Authority Police Department, which was responsible for the security of the World Trade Center, went into action to help with evacuation and rescue (911 Memorial, 2018).

President Bush was notified at 8:50 a.m.  At 8:55 a.m., the South Tower was declared secure, and no evacuation attempts were made. Four minutes later, it was decided to evacuate both towers.  And, at 9:00 a.m., all civilians were ordered to evacuate the World Trade Center complex.  At 9:02 a.m., evacuation efforts were underway, when the South Tower was attacked at 9:03 a.m.  President Bush was further informed at 9:05 a.m., and Mayor Rudy Giuliani arrived at the New York City Police Department Command Post (911 Memorial, 2018).

At 9:30 a.m., the Mayor’s Office of Emergency Management evacuated its office at the World Trade Center.  Vice-President Dick Cheney was evacuated from the White House (911 Memorial, 2018).

The Pentagon attack occurred at 9:37 a.m.  Emergency personnel immediately responded.  At 9:45 a.m., the White House and the U.S. Capitol Building were evacuated (911 Memorial, 2018).

The South Tower of the World Trade Center collapsed at 9:59 a.m.  At 10:15 a.m., the Pentagon E-ring collapsed.  The North Tower of the World Trade Center collapsed at 10:28 a.m., and the evacuation of lower Manhattan began at 11:02 a.m.  At 5:20 p.m., the entire World Trade Center collapsed.  All efforts after that were dedicated to putting out the fires, securing the crime site, finding and rescuing survivors, recovering the dead, identifying victims, and removing and cleaning up debris and body parts (Haddow, 2017; 911 Memorial, 2018).

In 2002, two after-action reports were released: Improving NYPD Emergency Preparedness and Response and Arlington County After-Action Report on the Response to the 9/11 Terrorist Attack on the Pentagon.  These reports helped to shape improvements in the emergency management discipline (Haddow, 2017).

The NYPD report identified twenty areas of improvement, with six warranting immediate action: “clearer delineation of roles and responsibilities of organizational leaders; better clarity in the chain of command; radio communications protocols and procedures that optimize information flow; more effective mobilization of response staff; more efficient provisioning and distribution of emergency and donated equipment; a comprehensive disaster response plan with a significant counterterrorism component” (Haddow, 2017).

It is easy to see here how the implementation of the National Incident Management System would have improved the response to the 9/11 World Trade Center attacks.  The Command and Management Component would have helped to define the authority of the Incident Commander and to clarify the chain of command.  The Communications and Information Management Component would have centralized communications and information sharing to present a clear picture of what was happening and what was needed.  The Resource Management Component would have coordinated the flow of personnel and equipment to the site to more efficiently deal with the disaster.  The Ongoing Management and Maintenance Component would have ensured that a comprehensive plan was in place to manage a major terrorist attack.  The Preparedness Component would have ensured that New York City was ready to bring all agencies together to work as an expert team in responding to a major disaster (DHS, 2008).

The response to the Pentagon attack was deemed a success due to its quick, coordinated, well-prepared response based on the Incident Command System.  Arlington County already had a Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan in place.  The Arlington County Fire Department had already considered the possibility of a weapons of mass destruction scenario and was well-prepared to respond (Haddow, 2017).

Conclusion

It is unfortunate that disasters have to occur in order to improve emergency management as a discipline and emergency response as a necessity of life.  But complacency is not an option.  Preparation is the key to effective response and recovery when disasters do occur.  The Incident Command System, guided by the core components of the National Incident Management System, is an effective tool for coordinating and managing preparation, planning, mitigation, response, and recovery of major disasters on the local, tribal, state, and federal levels.

Dawn Pisturino

Thomas Edison State University

September 18, 2019

Copyright 2019-2021 Dawn Pisturino. All Rights Reserved.

References

911 Memorial. (2018 ). 9/11 Memorial Timeline. Retrieved from

       http://www.timeline.911memorial.org/#FrontPage

Department of Homeland Security. (2008). National incident management system.

       Retrieved from http://www.fema.gov/nims.

Haddow, G.D., Bullock, J.A., & Coppola, D.P. (2017). Introduction to emergency

       management. (6^th ed.). Cambridge, MA: Elsevier.

Remembering the Joplin Tornado 2011

The Joplin, Missouri Tornado

Joplin is an urban community in Jasper County that is situated in the southwest corner of Missouri. Although it boasts an average population of around 49,024, the population swells to 270,000 during the day due to industrial, agricultural, and educational employment and resources. Southwest Missouri is considered part of “tornado alley.”

On Sunday, May 22, 2011, Joplin experienced the deadliest tornado in 47 years and the seventh deadliest in U.S. history. “At 2:40 pm, the National Weather Service (NWS) Storm Prediction Office issued a tornado watch-out for parts of Arkansas, Kansas, Missouri, and Oklahoma.” Three hours later, the Joplin/Jasper County Emergency Management began coordinating with the NWS to track the path of the storm. At 6:17 pm, a warning was broadcast to the public which gave them approximately 24 minutes to secure themselves in a safe environment. Outdoor emergency sirens were sounded then and again at 6:31 pm. “At 6:41 pm, an EF-5 tornado touched down in Joplin with winds exceeding 200 mph. The tornado cut a 22.1 mile path that was 1 mile wide and passed for 6 miles through the city.”

The results of the storm were devastating. The tornado “almost completely destroyed the commercial district of the city.” More than 15,000 vehicles were carried by the wind to new locations, many of them “rolled into balls of bent metal and broken glass by the force of the storm. In parking lots, concrete barriers designed to stop cars, each of them weighing 200-300 pounds and re-barred into asphalt, [were] plucked into the air and tossed as far as 60 yards.”

At St. John’s Medical Center, 183 patients were evacuated by staff within 90 minutes. Approximately 4,380 homes were completely destroyed; 3,884 homes suffered some kind of damage. More than 130 transmission poles went down, causing power outages to 18,000 customers. Thousands of buildings were destroyed, including St. John’s Medical Center and the Joplin High School. Three million cubic yards of debris lay scattered on the ground. The storm resulted in 161 deaths and 1,371 injuries.

Governor Jay Nixon declared Joplin a disaster area and called out the National Guard. Since “FEMA had been conducting disaster response and recovery in Missouri in the months prior to the Joplin tornado,” President Obama quickly mobilized the agency into action. The Joplin disaster was added to an emergency declaration previously declared by the President.

Joplin, Missouri Preparedness and Mitigation

One of the biggest issues to emerge from the Joplin tornado disaster was the weakness in Jasper County’s warning system. This weakness contributed to the catastrophic loss of life during the the Joplin tornado.

Jasper County’s warning system policy is to “sound sirens over the entire county even if only a part of the county is included, so sirens were sounded for three minutes that day [May 22, 2011] when a tornado warning was issued for the northern part of the county but didn’t include Joplin.”

Three minutes after the last siren was turned off, the National Weather Service (NWS) issued a tornado warning for Joplin. It was decided not to run the siren again. Residents of Joplin missed the tornado warning unless they were watching TV or listening to the radio.

The sirens did not sound again until the tornado was already descending on Joplin, and it was too late for residents to react.

The Springfield, Missouri National Weather Service misidentified and misreported the location of the tornado three times. Joplin residents were led to believe the “tornado would pass north of the city.”

The same National Weather Service was known for sounding the sirens too frequently. Jasper County’s policy — to sound the sirens for both tornado and severe thunderstorms — was based on the premise that any storm bringing strong winds warranted an alarm. Over a four year period, Jasper County issued 34 tornado warnings and sounded the sirens, even though only two tornado warnings were issued. People had become accustomed to the sirens and did not take them seriously.

On the night of May 22, 2011, residents heard the sirens but waited for confirmation of a serious tornado threat by watching TV or looking outside. They later reported confusion over the sirens that sounded right before the tornado hit because they did not understand the urgency of the situation. That urgency was not communicated to them through traditional channels.

People looking outside would not have seen the tornado because it was “completely and totally invisible” due to rain, making people dependent on the warning system. In spite of advanced technology, weather forecasters still cannot determine the course of a tornado because “radar can’t see a tornado moving on the ground.”

“Only human eyes can see a tornado on the ground; trained spotters remain a crucial part of the government’s warning program.” In fact, at 5:31 pm on May 22, 2011, storm chasers sighted a huge storm system west of Joplin and feared the worst. Eight minutes later, the storm turned into an EF-5 tornado. At 5:44 pm, Joplin residents still were not aware that a tornado had landed. People died due to lack of situational awareness.

Joplin suffered approximately $2.8 billion in economic loss due to the tornado. At least 30% of the city was impacted by the event.

It was later determined by the National Institute of Standards and Technology that houses in Joplin were not built to withstand strong winds. More than 83% of structural damage was caused by winds of 135 mph or less — equal to an EF-2 tornado. And 135 deaths were caused by collapsed buildings.

“Tornadoes have winds that create uplift or vertical suction that will pull a poorly-connected roof off of a house.” Many houses were not bolted to a foundation and roofs were not adequately anchored to walls. Home Depot collapsed because the roof was not properly anchored.

Flying debris from houses increased the overall damage. A study done by the American Society of Civil Engineers found that the use of hurricane ties — metal clips used to secure rafters and trusses to the outside walls of a house — were not required on homes by local building codes to withstand strong winds. Furthermore, U.S. model building codes did not require that tornado hazards be addressed at all in building codes.

The hospitals in the Joplin area were not prepared for the overwhelming influx of patients after the tornado. After St. John’s Medical Center was evacuated, the medical staff conducted field triage and medical treatment in the parking lot. People who were unaware of the damage to the hospital continued to bring patients there. Hospitals were forced to operate on emergency generators. Although EMS and medical personnel set up field triage stations throughout Joplin, they were forced to improvise due to a lack of medical supplies. Ambulances treated people on the spot instead of transporting them to the hospitals.

The Incident Command System was not prepared to deal with thousands of responders and volunteers. Responders did not coordinate with the local ICS even though staging areas and check-in procedures were in place. They lacked equipment and training and did not follow consistent protocols. Some buildings were searched multiple times because different groups of responders used different markings. The freelancing responders also posed a safety issue for other responders.

The Disaster Mortuary Operational Response Team (DMORT) was overwhelmed by fatalities. In spite of assistance from law enforcement and the Department of Human Health and Services, the team was only able to process 1 or 2 bodies per day. Families were identifying victims, but this stopped after a family misidentified a body. The Missouri Highway Patrol took control of the missing persons list in order to expedite matters. To top it off, personnel did not have training in fatality management.

Volunteers lacked training, supplies, and affiliations with well-established organizations. AmeriCorps took over management of volunteers.

“Communications and information sharing between the [Joint Field Office] and the [Joplin Division Office] proved to be challenging during the initial response.” There was no clear chain of command. The use of large data files with email and voice mail led to poor information management and dissemination. No common operating picture (COP) could be created due to an inadequate information management system. This hurt FEMA’s credibility.

During the tornado, social media was not effective because Joplin residents did not know what exactly was going on. Local leaders later realized that there was not enough engagement between the City of Joplin and the public. The city’s website was difficult to navigate for anybody seeking information.

On the positive side, “participation in the National Level Exercise 2011 (NLE 11) helped to prepare Federal, State, regional, local, and private sector personnel to respond effectively to the Joplin tornado.” From May 16-19, 2011, participants simulated a catastrophic earthquake. FEMA Region VII and the State of Missouri developed the Joint FEMA Region VII and State of Missouri New Madrid Earthquake Response Operations Plan. During the exercises, Missouri emergency management and response agencies practiced plans and procedures for mass casualty evacuation, mutual aid, and EMAC. The resources, systems, procedures, and partnerships exercised were later used in the Joplin response. Agencies learned how to activate and use regional resources. They learned about FEMA grant programs. They learned how to use a mobile field hospital and a patient moving and tracking system.

Over the years, “Southwest Missouri jurisdictions had undertaken a number of regional preparedness initiatives that proved instrumental for the response to the Joplin tornado.” These jurisdictions worked cooperatively on grants, exercises, training, and other preparedness opportunities within the Missouri Homeland Security Region D. FEMA training in ICS and other systems and procedures enabled a rapid, effective, coordinated regional response to the Joplin tornado.

The Response to the Joplin Tornado

The response to Joplin’s tornado followed FEMA’s Whole Community approach. “This only transpired because of the preparedness partnerships that had been developed among Federal, State, local, private sector, voluntary, and non-profit entities.” These partnerships “enabled emergency responders to meet the needs of survivors immediately after the Joplin tornado.”

The Four Corners Emergency Management mutual aid agreements were activated. The Southwest Missouri Incident Support Team provided valuable support to the Joplin/Jasper County emergency operations center (EOC). The team had received training and equipment through grants from the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). The Incident Support Team “used its satellite capabilities to augment communications to the Joplin/Jasper County EOC.”

Four Corners Emergency Management handled all calls for aid from Joplin. The Crawford County Health Department sent nurses and portable refrigerators to Joplin. Greene County provided 110 responders from the Sheriff’s Office, the Office of Emergency Management, the Highway Department, Building and Development Services, and Public Information.”

EMS and medical personnel, with the help of mutual aid agencies, set up field triage and medical treatment stations throughout Joplin. The State of Missouri activated the Missouri I Disaster Medical team, which set up an 8,000 square-foot, 60 bed mobile field hospital to treat patients.

Responders from more than 400 public safety organizations were sent to Joplin from Illinois, Kansas, Oklahoma, and other states as a result of the Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC). “Within 24 hours of the tornado, more than 800 police cars, 300 ambulances, 400 fire trucks, and 1,100 responders had arrived in Joplin to contribute to response operations.”

The City of Joplin worked with the Southwest Missouri Incident Support Team to create staging areas and check-in protocols. Standard Incident Command System procedures were established, and the daily Incident Action Plan was produced and distributed.

The Joplin Fire department lost two fire stations and necessary equipment during the tornado. But the department had to respond to routine calls as well as deal with the aftermath of the tornado. Help arrived from fire departments throughout southwest Missouri. Rural fire departments provided tanker trucks. The Southwest Missouri Incident Support Team contributed an experienced commander to help with operations. Integrated teams were developed, using both Joplin fire personnel and mutual aid responders. The Pierce Manufacturing Company loaned the city two pumper trucks. FEMA erected two modular buildings to replace the two fire stations that were destroyed.

The City of Joplin kept the community informed through press conferences, press releases, and news alerts. officials used email, the city’s website, Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube to disseminate information about shelters, volunteer opportunities, making donations, disaster recovery centers, and registering for FEMA disaster aid. The city tried to help victims and family members find each other.

Non-profit organizations such as the American Red Cross, AmeriCorps, and Citizens Corps descended on Joplin to help with the response. AmeriCorps established a missing persons hotline and agreed to manage the thousands of volunteers who arrived to help.

The Joplin Humane Society and Joplin Animal Control, with help from the American Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, the U.S. Department of Agriculture, the American Humane Association, the Humane Society of the United States, and Red Rover, opened animal shelters to house the hundreds of animals left homeless by the tornado. The Missouri Veterinary Medical Association sent three Missouri Volunteer Veterinary Corps (MOVVC) veterinarians to Joplin to care for the animals.

Utilities were quickly restored after the tornado due to the dedicated efforts of utility workers and mutual aid assistance from all over the Midwest. Sprint’s Emergency Response Team provided satellite phones and wireless devices to public safety officials. Company representatives from the private sector coordinated with State officials to get utilities restored.

The Federal Coordinating Officer at FEMA assigned Liaison Officers to particular city officials to keep them abreast of pertinent information and to respond to questions posed by city officials. This strengthened the coordination between Joplin and FEMA to provide disaster relief to the city. The Joplin Division Office of FEMA reached out to the community with instructions on how to register for disaster aid.

FEMA already had a strong presence in Missouri due to multiple disasters which had already occurred. On May 9, 2011, President Obama issued declaration FEMA-DR-1980 for five Missouri counties. On May 23, 2011, FEMA administrator Craig Fugate amended DR-1980 to include Jasper County. This allowed FEMA to provide Individual Assistance, debris removal, and emergency protective measures funding to individuals who registered for assistance.

What Changed After the Joplin Tornado

“Recovery and response efforts in Joplin were a combination of public and private efforts . . . the robust recovery in Joplin to date is due largely to federal, state, and local officials’ taking a hands-off approach to the recovery.”

More than 92,000 registered volunteers racked up more than 528,000 volunteer hours on Joplin’s response and recovery as of November 2011. Social media became a crucial tool in coordinating volunteer efforts.

“Insurance companies’ quick responses following the Joplin tornado helped tornado victims — both homeowners and business owners — get immediate relief.” Insurance adjusters arrived quickly in Joplin to assess rebuilding needs. “Insurance payments in Joplin exceeded $2 billion.”

Businesses actively participated in donating supplies and money to the recovery. Children became entrepreneurs and sold lemonade in order to contribute to the cause. Most importantly, businesses made commitments to quickly rebuild. Less than four months after the tornado, 69% of destroyed or damaged businesses had reopened.

The American Society of Civil Engineers concluded in a 2013 study that post-tornado houses in Joplin should be required to install hurricane ties that secure the rafters and trusses to the outside walls. But during the first months of recovery, “Joplin city officials unofficially waived building regulations, procedures, and local zoning laws in the immediate aftermath of the tornado” in order to facilitate rebuilding. The same study also recommended that safe rooms be incorporated into schools, hospitals, and other buildings. Yet, Joplin city officials opted not to require the installation of safe rooms in the aftermath of the tornado due to increased building costs. It was not until later that Joplin agreed to mandate hurricane ties on new home construction. The City also agreed to mandate anchor bolts, which attach a building’s frame to the foundation, and masonry reinforced with metal bars. The city finally agreed to start requiring safe rooms and wind-resistant windows in schools, hospitals, and other buildings.

A moratorium on new housing construction was implemented to facilitate debris removal. FEMA agreed to pay for 90% of debris removal and the State of Missouri agreed to pay the remaining 10%.

Six months after the tornado, FEMA released an update on Joplin’s recovery efforts. They revealed that the Army Corps of Engineers had facilitated debris removal and the construction of temporary buildings for schools, the fire department, and the hospital. Since 9,500 residents had been displaced from their homes, the Housing Task Force had been working hard to provide rentals for them.

After the tornado, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration recommended changes in Jasper County’s warning system that would more effectively communicate urgent warnings to the public. Some of their recommendations included sirens with different sounds, the use of color coding on TV and online to indicate the severity of a storm threat, and using social media and mobile devices to communicate more accurate weather information to the public. The agency also recommended that weather forecasters become more proactive and use ominous and forceful language to convey urgency about imminent threats.

Based on these recommendations, Jasper County applied for federal funding to purchase 10,000 weather radios and construct 4,000 storm shelters, both of which were seriously lacking prior to the tornado.

CivicPlus, a government website builder, agreed in 2012 to build a new website for the City of Joplin. The company built a user-friendly website that enhances two-way engagement between city officials and the public, especially during emergencies.

Other social media networkers have created pages on Facebook and Twitter to prepare their own communities for disaster and provide information on emergency response and recovery. One such site is “Joplin Tornado Info,” started by Rebecca Williams and her mother, Genevieve, right after the tornado. The page still actively relays information about Joplin and its recovery efforts.

Missouri hospitals upgraded their emergency response capabilities after the Joplin tornado. The Missouri Hospital Association concluded: “Hospital leadership and management and emergency planners must continue to make emergency preparedness a top priority within their organizations.”

Mental health professionals conducted a study on the effects of the Joplin tornado on the community and found that “long-term community disaster mental health monitoring, assessment, referral, outreach, and services are needed following a major disaster like the 2011 Joplin tornado.” The effects of such a disaster can lead to long-term depression and Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder and cause dysfunction in people who have not received post-disaster mental health services. According to Houston, “a significant amount of mental health outreach and referral was evident in the 1.5 years following the tornado.”

Conclusion

The residents of Joplin, Missouri had grown accustomed to storm threats bypassing their community, so they had no reason to believe that a third of the city would be destroyed by an EF-5 tornado on May 22, 2011.

They had grown accustomed to warning sirens blaring whenever weather forecasters spotted a storm with strong winds. Joplin residents had no reason to believe that the sirens which sounded on May 22, 2011 were any different from the ones they had heard hundreds of times before.

Weather forecasters could see on radar that a terrible storm was brewing, but they did not have the capability to recognize the formation of a deadly tornado until it was too late.

The City of Joplin was ill-prepared to withstand a tornado or any storm system with strong winds. Building codes did not require hurricane ties, anchor bolts, wind-resistant glass, or safe rooms. The city had few, if any, community storm shelters. The use of weather radios was not a common practice.

On the other hand, the City of Joplin, Jasper County, and the State of Missouri were well-prepared to respond to a disaster event. “FEMA had been conducting disaster response and recovery in Missouri in the months prior to the Joplin tornado.” The State already had experience dealing with FEMA and had spent several years building up preparedness relationships. Officials from Jasper County and the City of Joplin had participated in the Department of Homeland Security’s National Level Exercise 2011 program a few days before the tornado. They applied what they had learned to the response. And since President Obama had already issued FEMA-DR-1980 for five Missouri counties earlier in the year, it was easy for DHS administrator Craig Fugate to amend that declaration to include Jasper County.

Joplin’s response to the tornado was based on FEMA’s Whole Community approach. Mutual aid contracts were activated. Within 24 hours, help arrived from other Midwestern states and counties throughout southwest Missouri. Non-profit organizations set up relief shelters, hotlines, and animal shelters. Businesses donated money and supplies.

Joplin leadership encouraged the community to rebuild quickly, using all available resources. The residents of Joplin showed resiliency, flexibility, and adaptability in their recovery.

Dawn Pisturino

October 2019

Thomas Edison State University

Copyright 2019-2021 Dawn Pisturino. All Rights Reserved.

Please contact author for sources.

Remembering the California Camp Fire 2018

Huffington Post Photo

Around 6:30 a.m. on November 8, 2018, the deadliest fire in California history broke out near Pulga, Butte County, California after a Pacific Gas & Electric high tension power line fell to the ground. Strong winds spread the fire to Concow, Paradise, Magalia, Chico, and Centerville.

Thousands of people, pets, and livestock were forced to evacuate. Towns not touched by the fire were overwhelmed with evacuees. Community organizers set up shelters and tent cities. Representatives from insurance companies and FEMA erected stations to help people affected by the fire.

By the time the fire was extinguished three weeks later, 153,336 acres and over 18,800 structures had been destroyed. At least 86 people perished.

Pacific Gas & Electric took responsibility for the fire and immediately began the cleanup process. But the costs of the damage forced PG&E to file for bankruptcy and cleanup efforts were delayed.

The cleanup has been estimated to take two or three years. Over 1,500 people were hired to remove debris. They must be certified in Hazmat cleanup due to concerns about asbestos. PG&E moved forward with its tree removal program to help prevent future wildfires.

A major hazard after the fire was the contamination of the water supplies. Benzene, a known carcinogenic, was released into the water when water pipes melted. People were forced to drink bottled water or install huge water tanks and have water delivered by truck. This hit surviving businesses particularly hard.

Many people who lost their homes and jobs moved away to start fresh someplace else. Six months after the fire, only 1,500 residents had returned to Paradise out of a population of 27,000. Businesses supplying basic goods re-opened with limited hours. Internet, telephone, and electricity services were restored.

More than 1,000 animals were rescued and taken to shelters, an overwhelming number. Six months later, all but 200 had been placed with new or recovered families.

On August 6, 2019, the Butte County Public Health Department issued a press release indicating that many locations in the Camp Fire burn area remain under the do-not-drink water advisory. Water quality is monitored by the California State Water Resources Control Board.

Agencies which have cooperated with response and recovery include: the California Department of Fire, California Department of Transportation, California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, California Highway Patrol, California Office of Emergency Services, National Weather Service, California Conservation Corps, Butte County, and the City of Chico, California.

Dawn Pisturino

September 10, 2019

Copyright 2019-2020 Dawn Pisturino. All Rights Reserved.

Please contact author for sources.

DHS, FEMA, and the National Incident Management System

9/11

Introduction

After the end of the Cold War, America faced new challenges as the world’s leading military power. The failure of the old Soviet Union left a leadership vacuum which created new opportunities for terrorist organizations, petty dictators, and rogue countries to asset their influence and power. The end result was the terrorist attack on the World Trade Center on the morning of September 11, 2001 by an Islamic group known as Al Qaeda.

Amid all the post-attack horror and shock, two questions stood out: what did the U.S. government know — and why wasn’t the threat taken more seriously? Congress created the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States on November 27, 2002 to answer those questions and to address the need for a more comprehensive national preparedness system.

A Discussion of the Origins of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)

Al Qaeda was organized by Osama bin Laden in 1988 after the Soviet Union abandoned Afghanistan. After the World Trade Center bombing in 1993 and several attacks on foreign soil, the CIA concluded in 1995 that there would be increasing terrorist attacks against and in the United States but attributed these attacks to loosely-affiliated individuals with special training who could disappear underground. It wasn’t until 1996-1997 that the CIA became aware of Bin Laden’s terrorist organization. In spite of this knowledge, officials failed to share the complete information about Bid Laden and his activities in their updated reports.

Between 1998 and 2001, more information was compiled about Bin Laden and Al Qaeda, but the CIA failed to comprehend the importance or urgency of the information. Even when select individuals tried to point out the threat and devised plans of action, those plans were usually shot down by Washington, D.C. bureaucrats as too expensive, too unrealistic, or too inadequate.

Part of the problem was the expectation that a major terrorist attack would be achieved through chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weapons. And since Al Qaeda possessed none of these, the threat it posed was minimized. The few small-scale attacks the group had achieved overseas, such as the attack on the U.S.S. Cole in October 2000, were not considered important enough to beef up national security. And the idea of using airplanes for suicide bombings was not considered a credible scenario for most Washington bureaucrats — including Presidents Bill Clinton and George W. Bush.

It’s no surprise, then, that the American people were horrified to learn that a small group of radical Islamic terrorists — armed only with simple box cutters — were able to hijack American commercial jets and slam into the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. The federal government was compelled to act.

The Department of Homeland Security was created by President George W. Bush with Executive Order 13228 on October 8, 2001 in response to the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. The mission of the new department was “to develop and coordinate the implementation of a comprehensive national strategy to secure the United States from terrorist threats or attacks.” It was specifically mandated “to coordinate the executive branch’s efforts to detect, prepare for, prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from terrorist attacks within the United States.”

President Bush’s order covers the five basic elements of emergency management: preparedness, prevention (mitigation), protection, response, and recovery in coordination with federal, state, and local agencies, private businesses, and non-profit organizations. But one of the most important features of the order is the gathering and dissemination of information relating to homeland security with “state and local governments and private entities.” The order establishes the Homeland Security Council, with members representing the most important departments in the federal government.

An Examination of the Relationship between the DHS and FEMA

With the creation of the Department of Homeland Security, President Bush focused the nation’s attention on terrorism and potential terrorist threats and attacks. Executive Order 13228 orders the Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) to “assist in the implementation of national security emergency preparedness policy by coordinating with the other federal departments and agencies and with state and local governments, and by providing periodic reports to the National Security Council and the Homeland Security Council on implementation of national security emergency preparedness policy.”

Section 503 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 transfers accountability and responsibility of the Federal Emergency Management Agency — including its Director — to the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security as part of the department’s overall goal of building a comprehensive National Incident Management System (NIMS). “NIMS was [ultimately] created to integrate effective practices in emergency preparedness and response into a comprehensive national framework for incident management. NIMS enables responders at all levels to work together more effectively and efficiently to manage domestic incidents no matter what the cause, size, or complexity, including catastrophic acts of terrorism and disasters.” By making NIMS “a requirement for many federal grant programs,” the federal government has been able to promote a formalized, centralized, and coordinated national response plan which “provides a systematic, proactive approach to guide departments and agencies at all levels of government” in the event of disaster. “NIMS provides the template for the management of incidents, while the NRF [National Response Framework] provides the structure and mechanisms for national-level policy for incident management.”

Section 507 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 outlines the role and functions of FEMA and mandates that the agency follow a comprehensive emergency management program (NIMS) which includes mitigation, planning, preparedness, response, and recovery. The act designates FEMA as the leading agency for implementing the national emergency response plan.

FEMA successfully responded to the Midwest Floods of 1993, the Northridge, California earthquake, the Oklahoma City bombing, the Seattle earthquake, and the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. But, once FEMA was absorbed into the Department of Homeland Security, its effectiveness declined. The agency’s response to Hurricane Katrina under President George W. Bush, for example, was considered a failure.

FEMA’s failure has been attributed to loss of autonomy and access to the White House, loss of power and status, redistribution of funds and personnel to projects given higher priority (such as terrorism), excess bureaucracy in the upper levels of the Department of Homeland Security, and a lack of coordination with state and local governments. Congress passed several reform bills to help resolve these issues.

Discussion of HSPD-5 and HSPD-8

Although the Homeland Security Act of 2002 ordered the development and implementation of a comprehensive national response plan, it was Homeland Security Presidential Directive-5 (February 28, 2003) which formally called for the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security to come up with a national incident management system and national response plan that would improve coordination between departments, states, and local governments in the event of a major incident.

Homeland Security Presidential Directive-8 (December 17, 2003) proposed policies that would strengthen domestic preparedness to deal with major disasters (including terrorist attacks). Once again, coordination responsibility fell onto the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security with the goal of keeping the country ready at all times. This directive was aimed particularly at first responders by providing training programs and offering incentive rewards to the states.

With the Department of Homeland Security in control of devising and implementing a well-coordinated national response plan, it is ironic that the department failed so miserably in the face of Hurricane Katrina.

Conclusion

With the continued threats facing America, it is more important then ever for the country to avoid complacency and stay alert in order to recognize, prevent, and respond effectively to potential and actual disasters. We must learn from both our successes and our failures as we move forward into the future.

Dawn Pisturino

Thomas Edison State University, 2019

Copyright 2019-2020 Dawn Pisturino. All Rights Reserved.

Please contact author for sources.

The Hoover Dam – What if it Broke?

The Hoover Dam – What if it Broke?

I.

At any given time, Lake Mead – which is held back by the Hoover Dam — can supply water to 29 million households in Arizona, California, Colorado, Nevada, New Mexico, Utah, and Wyoming. Turbines and generators at Hoover Dam turn water energy into electrical energy. A failure at Hoover Dam would cut off both water and power to all of these seven states, and especially, to all the communities located in the Colorado River Basin.

A breach in the Hoover Dam wall would cause 10 trillion gallons of water from Lake Mead to form a tsunami wave that would travel down the Colorado River, destroying Davis Dam, Parker Dam, and several bridges, and wiping out Lake Mead, Lake Mohave, and Lake Havasu. Communities located on the Colorado River would be flooded.

There would be an immediate loss of hydroelectric power, irrigation water, and drinking water that millions of people in all seven states depend on. The economic losses would be devastating.

Bullhead City, Arizona is one of the cities located on the Colorado River. The U.S. Bureau of Reclamation would immediately notify Bullhead City and Mohave County [in Arizona] of the impending catastrophe. The Mohave County Disaster Plan for uncontrolled releases from dams would be activated, involving the Mohave County Department of Risk and Emergency Management and multiple other departments in Bullhead City and Mohave County. The Arizona Department of Public Safety, the Arizona State Parks Department, and the Lake Mead National Recreation Area [in Nevada] would also be involved.

It would require expert and efficient coordination and excellent communication capabilities to evacuate 30,000 people (the ones in Bullhead City, Arizona living closest to the river) in 90 minutes, before the water held back by Hoover Dam and then Davis Dam, hit Bullhead City. In spite of all evacuation plans to move people to Golden Valley and Kingman, Arizona, people would greet the news of a Hoover Dam failure with disbelief and then panic. Highway 95 is the only main route through Bullhead City. It would be jammed with traffic. People on higher ground might be safe from flooding, but they would be trapped by lack of alternate roads out of the city. Law enforcement would be essential to keeping the traffic moving.

It is my estimate that if 10,000 people managed to get out of town in 90 minutes, 10,000 residents would be trapped on higher ground, and 20,000 fatalities would result from drowning and injuries. Thirty miles of Highway 95 would be flooded by water. At least 16,000 homes and businesses would be flooded or destroyed. The local hospital, which sits on a hill, could only be accessed by helicopter. The sewer systems would be flooded, contaminating the environment. Remaining residents would be without power and water. They would have to walk through the hills to highway 68 or be flown out by helicopter. The American Red Cross and other volunteer organizations would have to set up emergency shelters in Golden Valley and Kingman, Arizona within two hours to help the survivors.

The Mohave County Board of Supervisors would ask the Governor of Arizona to declare an emergency situation. He, in turn, would ask the President of the United States to declare Bullhead City [and all other cities along the Colorado River] a disaster area. Bullhead City and Mohave County would be overwhelmed. FEMA would be mobilized.

II.

If an unknown terrorist group launched a nuclear device at Hoover Dam and caused a rupture in the concrete wall, the scenario would be the same as described above. In addition to physical and environmental damage and loss of human life, the air and water would be contaminated with radiation and debris. The 10,000 people who managed to stay behind on dry land would have to be rescued and evacuated over 24 hours due to exposure to radiation.

Emergency shelters would need to be set up within two hours by the American Red Cross and other volunteer organizations in Golden Valley and Kingman, Arizona to supply food, water, and other basic needs to survivors. But over the next day, wind currents would bring the radiation over the mountains and into Golden Valley and Kingman. Local law enforcement would pass out gas masks and be on patrol to control panic, looting, and general disorder while State and County emergency workers evacuated the area.

The Mohave County Board of Supervisors would ask the Governor of Arizona to declare an emergency situation. He, in turn, would ask the President of the United States to declare the area a disaster zone. FEMA would be mobilized to the area.

Conclusion: When President Trump talks about our deteriorating infrastructure, We the People need to take it more seriously. There are a number of dams across the country which need much-needed repairs and reinforcement. Waiting for a disaster to occur is unacceptable. When he talks about preventing terrorists from entering the country, he knows what he’s talking about. Our deteriorating infrastructure is vulnerable to attack.

Dawn Pisturino

September 2019 and April 23, 2020

Copyright 2019-2020 Dawn Pisturino. All Rights Reserved.

Contact author for sources.

Remembering the Oklahoma City Bombing 1995

Photo by By Staff Sergeant Preston Chasteen – Defense Imagery

The 1995 Oklahoma City bombing is considered “the deadliest and most destructive act of domestic terrorism” in American history. Using a fertilizer bomb which cost around $5,000, Timothy McVeigh and Terry Nichols partially collapsed the Alfred P. Murrah federal building in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma and “destroyed or damaged 324 buildings in a 16 block radius.” The glass shattered in another 258 buildings in a radius of 55 miles. Damages were estimated at $650 million. Deaths totaled 168 people, including 19 children in the building’s daycare center, and injured around 700 people.

The event did not affect Oklahoma City alone. The small town of Kingman, Arizona, the Mohave County seat, was suddenly catapulted into the national news when it came out that Timothy McVeigh had been living in Kingman just months before the bombing. His Army friend, Michael Fortier, helped him to plan the bombing. When the FBI raided his mobile home, they found over 100 detonators.

How do I know this? I live outside Kingman, Arizona. And Timothy McVeigh had lived in the Kingman area on and off for several years. He was an occupant at a particular motel in Kingman. He worked at a local True Value hardware store. At one time, he worked at a well-known casino in Laughlin, Nevada. My husband, who was a Pit Boss at the time, knew him as a fellow employee. McVeigh drove an old yellow Buick which I saw drive by our house on more than one occasion.

Timothy McVeigh had become friendly with well-known pro-gun, anti-government activists in the area. A few months before the Oklahoma City, Oklahoma bombings, strange things were happening around Kingman, Arizona.

A large fertilizer explosive device was exploded out in the remote desert near the living ghost town of Oatman, which has never been explained or solved. At least 2 bomb threats were called in to Black Mountain Elementary School in Golden Valley. The perpetrators were never caught.

After the Oklahoma City bombing occurred on April 19, 1995 (the two year anniversary of the end of the Waco, Texas stand-off), the FBI descended onto Kingman to investigate the Kingman connection. Residents responded to this invasion by selling T-shirts which read, “I Survived the FBI.” In spite of their presence and the investigation, I have always believed that some of the conspirators got away. They simply disappeared underground.

Could the Oklahoma City bombing have been prevented? Probably not. There was no way to predict that the strange happenings around Kingman would lead to such a major man-made disaster. They appeared to be random events. But hindsight suggests that they could have been exercises conducted by the conspirators, leading up to the BIG EVENT.

One thing is certain: “the Oklahoma City bombing in April 1995 . . . raised the issue of America’s preparedness for terrorism events.” Since emergency management as a discipline deals with risks, the avoidance of risks, and the consequences of risks, it made sense to include terrorism under the big umbrella.

FEMA was an independent agency then which had grown in status and importance under President Bill Clinton. As a result, the agency was able to respond to the bombing within 45 minutes of notification of the event. Section 501(b) of the Stafford Act gives FEMA primary authority to respond to a domestic disaster, and this authority was exercised for the first time with the Oklahoma City bombing. FEMA coordinated with the FBI to preserve and control the crime site. This experience helped to clarify responsibilities and authority in future disasters.

Oklahoma was well-prepared for the disaster. The immediate response was to publicly request the assistance of all medical personnel in the area. Volunteers and volunteer organizations, such as the American Red Cross, arrived to help. Hospitals set up triage stations. Local law enforcement and EMS personnel utilized their excellent training. The state of Oklahoma had already worked hard to perfect coordination between the Public Works Department, the National Weather Service, and the National Guard. The Department of Public Safety had already developed a strong disaster plan. The entire state was involved in responding to the disaster. This has been dubbed the Oklahoma Standard.

In the aftermath of the Oklahoma City bombing, FEMA created Project Impact: Building Disaster-Resistant Communities which asked communities “to identify risks and establish a plan to reduce those risks.” This kind of community-based action is exactly what is needed to mitigate (prevent) events from happening and to keep communities prepared to respond effectively after the event has happened.

Source: Haddow, G.D., Bullock, J.A., & Coppola, D.P. (2017). Introduction to emergency

       management. Cambridge, MA: Elsevier Inc.

Dawn Pisturino

August 13, 2019

Copyright 2019-2020 Dawn Pisturino. All Rights Reserved.

Remembering the Laughlin River Run Riot 2002

 

Laughlin is a small township in Clark County, Nevada which lies along the Colorado River, across from Bullhead City, Arizona. It takes about 25 minutes to drive from Laughlin to Needles, California. Laughlin boasts a constable and a handful of police officers. For intensive law enforcement needs, it relies on the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department – located 90 miles away in Las Vegas, Nevada.

Laughlin is known for its nine casinos and annual Laughlin River Run, a motorcycle gathering which began in 1983. On April 27, 2002, Laughlin made the national news when a deadly brawl broke out between two rival outlaw motorcycle gangs: the Hells Angels and the Mongols.

The Flamingo Hotel (now called the Aquarius) was host to the Hells Angels, while Harrah’s was filled with Mongols. Around 2:15 am on Saturday, April 27th, approximately 35 Hells Angels entered Harrah’s and verbally engaged with about 40 Mongols hanging out in Rosa’s Cantina bar. The brawl began when Hells Angels member Raymond Foakes attacked a member of the Mongols. Two Hells Angels died by shooting, and one Mongols member died by stabbing. Dozens of people were injured, including sixteen who were transported by EMS to Western Arizona Regional Medical Center in Bullhead City, Arizona and University Medical Center in Las Vegas, Nevada. Police confiscated 50 knives and numerous guns.

There were about 140 police officers on patrol in Laughlin for the event. Police immediately shut down the town, closing off all exit routes. Hundreds of law enforcement officers and SWAT members arrived from Kingman and Bullhead City, Arizona; Needles, California; and Las Vegas, Nevada. The casinos shut down, stranding people wherever they were.

My husband was the Pit Boss on graveyard at the Golden Nugget, where tensions between the Hells Angels and the Mongols first flared. According to him, customers who were stranded there were given pillows and blankets and allowed to sleep around the pool.

Police interviewed more than 500 people, and surveillance tapes clearly showed what happened. They arrested several people. Harrah’s made counselors available to guests and employees and opened an information hotline. Then they re-opened the casino on Saturday afternoon. In fear of retaliation, the town was kept on tight security and police watch. Bikers who were free to leave left en masse on Sunday morning.

Harrah’s later lost a lawsuit which claimed that the casino knew about tensions between the two outlaw motorcycle gangs and did not do enough to beef up security. Harrah’s denied all responsibility.

The motives for the brawl were based on years of gang rivalry between the Hells Angels and the Mongols. A vendor selling Hells Angels gear was harassed by Mongols members at the event. A Hells Angels biker was found dead by police along Interstate 40 near Ludlow, CA. He was on his way home from Laughlin to San Diego. Police determined that he was killed about an hour before the riot.

The River Run Riot, as it is now called, spurred the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department to increase police presence, information sharing, and surveillance for future Laughlin River Runs. Officers from the Department of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms manned checkpoints with special firearm-sniffing dogs to disclose hidden firearms. The curfew for juveniles from 6 pm to 5 am was continued, and glass and metal drink containers were prohibited.

The Laughlin casinos, which chip in to pay for security and law enforcement presence, increased their hotel prices and made the River Run much less friendly to outlaw biker clubs. The River Run began to draw fewer crowds, and some anti-Laughlin biker gatherings emerged. The costs became greater than the benefits, and the last Laughlin River Run was held in April, 2019.

The remarkable response by law enforcement to the incident minimized the deaths and injuries that could have occurred. The multi-jurisdictional cooperation between Arizona, Nevada, and California brought a number of people to justice and helped make towns and highways safer, during and after the event.

Dawn Pisturino

September 9, 2019

Copyright 2019-2020 Dawn Pisturino. All Rights Reserved.

Contact author for sources.